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Abstract The paper focuses on a single firm with constant returns to scale in a multi-
period setting with incomplete markets and a single good per state. The firm can be
organized as a partnership or as a corporation. In the case of a partnership, there are no
initial shares and profits vanish. A corporation has initial shareholders and can sell its
output at any market-clearing price. An example shows that the introduction of initial
shares can cause a Pareto improvement. The firm sells its output below costs so that
the net sellers of initial shares subsidize the net buyers. The initial shares are chosen
such that, for each consumer, the benefits of the output expansion more than outweigh
the cost increase.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on a single firm with constant returns to scale in a setting with
incomplete markets, more than two time periods and a single good per state. Two
different types of firms, partnerships and corporations, are compared; see §31 and
§32 of Magill and Quinzii (1996), henceforth referred to as MQ. In the case of a
partnership, a group of consumers gets together to found a firm. Because of constant
returns to scale, there are no incentives to exclude a consumer.
The main difference between partnerships and corporations is that the former have
no initial owners, whereas the latter are initially owned by consumers. When the firm
is organized as a partnership, the output price equals the cost and no profits accrue.
In the case of a corporation, initial shares are exogenously allocated before markets
open. Shares are traded at all non-terminal nodes and profits can have any sign.
In the particular case of finance economies with only two periods, the first-order
condition for constrained efficiency requires marginal cost pricing and there is no
need for initial shares. The paper addresses the following question: Shall the firm in
the multi-period case always be organized as a partnership or can initial shares help
to improve efficiency and welfare?
This question is studied from a purely normative perspective in a particularly simple
and transparent model. The paper abstracts from all kinds of real life complications.
In particular, there are no liability and bankruptcy problems, no competition and no
strategic interaction. The only assets are shares in the firm. Moreover, every consumer
participates in the firm and takes part in the firm’s decision problem.
The objective of a firm used in this paper can be described most easily in the case
of a corporation. In this case, social welfare maximization takes into account how the
original shares impact market outcomes. When the initial shares are sold below costs,
the net sellers of initial shares subsidize the net buyers. When the shares are sold above
costs, the redistribution of wealth is reversed. In the case of a partnership, all market
transactions leave the distribution of wealth unaltered.
Under the assumption that every consumer holds at least a tiny amount of initial
shares, the welfare of the initial owners coincides with the welfare of the society. Oth-
erwise, the group of initial owners could exploit the rest of the economy. A corporation
chooses, as in any Cournot model, an output vector. All functions used to analyze the
model depend directly or indirectly on the firm’s output so that the independent vari-
able can be dropped in the present introductory explanation. Consumers anticipate the
market clearing prices correctly and determine their optimal trades on all markets. In
equilibrium, all markets clear.
It is well known that even very weak welfare requirements can be out of reach
because of second-order effects. Therefore, a first-order approach is adopted to select
production plans that are candidates for social welfare maximization. More precisely,
production plans are sorted out whenever first-order welfare improvements are possi-
ble.1
1 There are Hicksian surplus concepts which incorporate higher order effects in different ways so as to
obtain a cardinal social welfare measure or a cardinal efficiency measure. The referees suggested to leave
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In line with the usual definition of state prices or stochastic discount factors, every
utility function is normalized such that the marginal utility of good 0 equals 1 in equi-
librium. The (indirect) social welfare function W is the sum of all normalized indirect
utility functions. The corporation chooses its production plan such that the first-order
condition for welfare maximization is satisfied. For a more extensive explanation, see
Sect. 2.
In the case of a partnership, the basic principle is the same. However, the firm
must take the pricing constraint into account. The partnership aims to satisfy the
first-order condition for constrained welfare maximization. It is worth emphasizing
that the degree of complexity of multi-period models of production economies with
incomplete markets comes close to that of models of Cournot competition.
1.1 Relationship to the literature
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) introduce a model that combines Cournot-Nash com-
petition with Walrasian exchange of consumption goods under the assumption that
markets are complete. The basic idea can be described as follows: The consumption
goods are produced by firms who need non-marketable primary factors as inputs.
Every firm chooses its production plan. The consumers possess preassigned shares
of the firms, provide the primary factors in accordance with their shares, and receive
their shares of the firms’ output. Thereafter, Walrasian exchange of the consumption
goods takes place at market clearing prices. The main difference between Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972) and the present paper is that they focus on oligopolistic competition
with complete markets, whereas this paper focuses on market incompleteness without
oligopolistic competition.
Both papers have in common that they deal with preassigned, initial shares. First,
the production plans are chosen. Thereafter, the output is distributed and the consumers
obtain their intermediate endowments. Finally, Walrasian exchange takes place and
the intermediate endowments are traded at their equilibrium prices. In multi-period
models of corporations, the exchange occurs repeatedly. Both papers deal with the
redistribution of initial wealth, however, from different perspectives. Gabszewicz and
Vial focus on the profit motive of oligopolists, whereas this papers abstracts from
that motive and uses the possibility to redistribute wealth to enhance efficiency and
welfare.
Guesnerie (1975) points out that a redistribution of wealth can be needed to achieve
a Pareto improvement when one leaves the classical Arrow–Debreu framework. In
his paper, the aggregate production set fails to be convex and marginal cost pricing
becomes a necessary requirement for Pareto efficiency. Several marginal cost pricing
equilibria exist, however, none of them is Pareto efficient given the distribution of the
firms’ profits or losses. To obtain a Pareto-efficient marginal cost pricing equilibrium,
the original distribution scheme needs to be changed. According to the fundamental
Footnote 1 continued
such issues out because the main point of the paper can be made on the basis of Pareto comparisons (rather
than Kaldor–Hicks comparisons).
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theorems of welfare economics, no such problem arises in the convex case. In the
context of a standard GEI model with numéraire assets and a finite set of commodities
at each of S + 1 spot markets, the connection between endowment redistribution and
Pareto improvements has been investigated by Mendolicchio and Pietra (2016).
The main goal of this paper is to present an example of a partnership equilibrium that
is Pareto dominated by a corporation equilibrium of the same economy with suitably
chosen initial shares.
2 Corporations, partnerships, and their objectives
It suffices to consider a three-period economy whose underlying date-event tree has
the initial state s = 0 at t = 0 and states s = 1, . . . , S at t > 0. There is a single good
per state and a single firm with constant returns to scale technology Y ⊂ R− × RS+.
A production vector is denoted y = (y0, y+). The firm can be a corporation or a
partnership. To define social welfare in either case, every (indirect) utility function
is normalized such that the marginal utility of good 0 equals 1 at the equilibrium
under consideration. One marginal unit of good 0 increases social welfare by one unit
independently of who consumes the unit.2
Consumer i’s normalized utility gradient π i describes i’s state price system or
vector of stochastic discount factors. The social welfare of a group of consumers is the
sum of the normalized indirect utility functions of its members. This paper focuses on
the social welfare of all consumers.
Consider first the case of a corporation with initial shares δi ≥ 0 and ∑i δi = 1.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that consumers have smooth preferences in the
sense of Debreu, see e.g., MQ, p. 50. There is a stock market at each non-terminal node.
The implicit function theorem is used to express all functions directly or indirectly as
functions of y+. First one determines, for every consumer i and every non-terminal
node s, the demand ϑ is (y+) for shares which determine i’s consumption xi (y+). Then
one solves the system of market-clearing equations to obtain an equilibrium price
vector. The equilibrium price at node s in denoted qs .
In a corporation economy, the output stream y+ is sold at the market-clearing price
q0(y+). The set of stock market equilibria is characterized by
Ycorp =
{
y+ ∈ proj2Y |
∑
i
ϑ is (y+) = 1 for every non-terminal state s
}
,
where proj2 denotes the projection to RS+.
Assume that there is a planner who can choose the production plan and make
infinitesimal transfers of good 0. However, the use of the transfers is severely restricted
because this paper uses the concept of minimal efficiency which prevents any change
2 This social welfare concept differs from the one used in utilitarian welfare theory. The latter relies on
cardinal utility measures and cardinal unit comparability across consumers whereas the present approach
is based on the comparison of marginal utility units.
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of consumption at t > 0.3 Can this planner find a first-order Pareto improvement over
the allocation of the reference equilibrium induced by y∗+? To answer this question,
define social welfare as:
Wy∗(y+) =
∑
i
U i (xi (y+))
∂0Ui (xi (y∗+))
. (1)
Whenever DWy∗(y∗+) does not vanish, a first-order welfare improvement exists. To
avoid such equilibria, corporations are required to satisfy the first-order condition
DWy∗(y∗+) = 0 for welfare maximization. When one differentiates Wy∗(y+) with
respect to ys, s = 1, . . . , S, one obtains, dropping the arguments, the first-order con-
dition
∂s y0 +
I∑
i=1
S∑
σ=1
π iσ ∂s x
i
σ = 0 for s = 1, . . . , S. (2)
The objective of the corporation is to satisfy condition (2). A stock market equilibrium
is a corporation equilibrium iff DWy∗(y∗+) = 0. Observe that equation (2) is signif-
icantly more complex than a convex combination of utility gradients π i . In contrast
to the two-period case, no envelope theorem applies and π iσ ∂s xiσ does typically not
vanish when s = σ .
One may feel tempted to require the corporation to fulfill more than the first-order
condition for welfare maximization. However, the following problem arises already
in the two-period case. In that particular setting, the first-order condition for wel-
fare maximization coincides with the first-order condition for constrained efficiency.
Dierker and Dierker (2010) consider two-period economies and present robust exam-
ples that show that a unique Drèze equilibrium can maximize welfare although it is
not minimally efficient. The Drèze equilibrium can also minimize welfare although it
is constrained efficient.
Turn now to the case of partnership economies. At t = 0, every consumer i can
become a partner by obtaining the share ϑ i0 > 0 of the output y+ in exchange for the
cost share ϑ i0C where C = |y0|. The partnership operates at a scale that is determined
by the condition
∑
i ϑ
i
0(y+) = 1.
Apart from t = 0, there is no difference between the description of a partnership or
a corporation. Loosely speaking, a partnership is a corporation with constant returns
to scale, a missing stock market at t = 0, and price-taking behavior.
When one wants to convert a corporation with constant returns to scale into a
partnership one has to abolish the initial shares δi . This is achieved by the pricing rule
q0 = C . In a corporation, i’s consumption at t = 0 is xi0 = ei0 − δi C + (δi −ϑ i0)q0 =
ei0 + δi (q0 − C) − ϑ i0q0 where ei0 is i’s initial endowment at t = 0. If q0 = C the
initial shares δi vanish so that xi0 = ei0 − ϑ i0C as in a partnership.
Consider the case in which δi = ϑ i0 for every i . Then i’s demand for good 0 is
independent of whether the firm is a corporation or a partnership. However, unless
3 A planner associated with constrained efficiency is much stronger because he can allocate all shares.
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i’s utility is quasilinear, δi will typically impact i’s demand for shares at subsequent
stock markets.
At t = 1, the partnership goes public. There is a stock market at every non-terminal
node s ≥ 1 on which the shares ϑ is (y+) are sold at the market-clearing price qs(y+).
In equilibrium, all stock markets clear, that is to say,
∑
i ϑ
i
s (y+) = 1. In the case of a
partnership economy, the set of stock market equilibria is characterized by
Ypart =
{
y+ ∈ proj2Y | q0(y+) = C(y+) and
∑
i
ϑ is (y+) = 1 for all markets
}
.
A partnership equilibrium is a stock market equilibrium with the property that
first-order welfare gains on Ypart are impossible.
3 Numerical example
There are three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and seven states. State 0 at t = 0 is followed
by states 1 and 2 at t = 1. At t = 2, states 3 and 4 follow state 1 and states 5 and 6
follow state 2. There is a single good per state and a single firm.
Consider three types of consumers, A, B and Q, with additively separable, concave
utility functions. The utility function of type Q is quasilinear. Define
U A(x0, x1, . . . , x6) = 10 log(x0) + 1 log(x1) + 2 log(x2) + 3 log(x3)
+ 4 log(x4) + 5 log(x5) + 6 log(x6),
U B(x0, x1, . . . , x6) = 10 log(x0) + 3 log(x1) + 2 log(x2) + 1 log(x3)
+ 1 log(x4) + 2 log(x5) + 3 log(x6),
U Q(x0, x1, . . . , x6) = x0 + log(x1) + log(x2) + log(x3)
+ log(x4) + log(x5) + log(x6), (3)
respectively. There are no initial endowments except at t = 0 where every consumer
is endowed with eA0 = eB0 = eQ0 = 30. Ten consumers are of type A, ten of type B
and fifty of type Q. A production plan is denoted y = (y0, y+) ∈ R− × R6+ where
y+ = (y1, . . . , y6). The cost is
C(y+) = y1 + y2 + · · · , y6. (4)
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 contain the computation of the partnership equilibrium and
of the corporation equilibria, respectively. Section 3.3 explains how a corporation
equilibrium manages to Pareto dominate the partnership equilibrium.
3.1 Partnership equilibrium
In the partnership, consumer i consumes ei0 + ϑ i0 y0 at t = 0. The consumption at
an intermediate node ξs is xis = qs(ϑ is− − ϑ is ) + ϑ is− ys at t = 1, where ξs− is the
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immediate predecessor of ξs . If ξs is a terminal node, then i consumes xis = ϑ is− ys .
The size of the partnership is such that
∑
i ϑ
i
0 = 1.
The initial investment of a consumer of type A is ϑ A0 = 630/(31 C), ϑ A1 =
2205(q1 + y1)/(124 q1 C), and ϑ A2 = 6930(q2 + y2)/(403 q2 C) where the variable
y+ has been dropped. For consumers of type B, one obtains ϑ B0 = 180/(11 C), ϑ B1 =
72(q1 + y1)/(11 q1 C), and ϑ B2 = 900(q2 + y2)/(77 q2 C). A consumer of type Q
demands ϑ Q0 = 6/C, ϑ Q1 = 4(q1 + y1)/(q1 C), and ϑ Q2 = 4(q2 + y2)/(q2 C). When
the shares ϑ i0 add up to 1 then C = 227400/341. Solving the market-clearing equations
for markets 1 and 2 leads to q1 = (60463/30497) y1 and q2 = (151693/55241) y2.
Let yˆ = (y1, . . . , y5). The cost function (4) is used to eliminate the last component
y6 of y+ by defining y6 = g(yˆ) = 227400/341− y1 −· · ·− y5. Let y(yˆ) = (yˆ, g(yˆ)).
Then every function of y is indirectly a function of yˆ.
Dropping the variable yˆ, i’s consumption equals
xi = (ei0 −ϑ i0C, q1(ϑ i0 −ϑ i1)+ϑ i0 y1, q2(ϑ i0 −ϑ i2)+ϑ i0 y2, ϑ i1 y3, ϑ i1 y4, ϑ i2 y5, ϑ i2g).
Let ui (yˆ) = Ui (xi (yˆ)) be the utility i obtains when yˆ is chosen.
All consumers are partners so that the firm acts on behalf of the whole society.
Because x A0 = 30 − 630/31 = 300/31, A’s marginal utility of good 0 equals 31/30.
Similarly, B’s marginal utility equals 11/15. Thus, both normalization factors, α =
30/31 and β = 15/11, are independent of the allocation. Since there are 10 consumers
of type A, 10 of type B, and 50 of type Q social welfare Wˆ in the partnership is given
by Wˆy∗(yˆ) = 10 α U A(x A(yˆ)) + 10 β U B(x B(yˆ)) + 50 U Q(x Q(yˆ)). (5)
The first-order condition DWˆy∗(yˆ) = 0 can be solved algebraically. For sim-
plicity, numerical approximations are used to replace fractions and one obtains
yˆ∗ ≈ (100.5865, 96.6276, 92.6686, 102.346, 125.6598). The cost is C ≈ 666.8622
and the last coordinate of the production plan y∗ is y∗6 ≈ 148.9736. The stock prices
are q1 ≈ 1.9826 y1 and q2 ≈ 2.746 y2.
A consumer of type A, B, Q consumes, respectively,
x A(yˆ∗) ≈ (9.67742, 1.14284, 1.69707, 3.71744, 4.10566, 4.42033, 5.24044)
x B(yˆ∗) ≈ (13.6364, 4.41701, 2.53774, 1.36835, 1.51125, 3.00454, 3.56198)
x Q(yˆ∗) ≈ (24.0000, 0.89976, 1.08559, 0.83621, 0.92354, 1.02822, 1.21899).
This entails the utility profile (u A, u B , uQ) ≈ (50.8474, 39.1841, 23.9439). At
t = 0, the consumers choose (ϑ A0 , ϑ B0 , ϑ Q0 ) ≈ (0.030475, 0.024538, 0.008997).
Consider a weak planner who can change the allocation of shares at t = 0 but
not the production plan. After a reallocation of the shares ϑ i0, the prices of the stock
markets at t = 1 adjust and give rise to the weak planner’s optimal allocation.
In the example, the weak planner redistributes shares from A and B to Q and selects
(ϑ A0 , ϑ
B
0 , ϑ
Q
0 ) ≈ (0.030470, 0.024507, 0.009005).
A redistribution of shares at t = 0 can have welfare implications.
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3.2 Corporation equilibria
Let δτ denote the amount of original shares owned by an individual consumer of type
τ = A, B, Q. At s = 0, a consumer of type τ consumes the amount xτ0 = 30+δτ (q0−
C) − ϑτ0 q0. The original shares δτ change the consumption by xτ0 = δτ (q0 − C).
When τ = A or τ = B, there is an indirect impact on the demand for final shares
caused by an income effect. This leads to
ϑ A0 =
21(30 + δA(q0 − C))
31q0
, ϑ A1 = ϑ A0
7(q1 + y1)
8q1
, ϑ A2 = ϑ A0
11(q2 + y2)
13q2
(6)
ϑ B0 =
6 (30 + δB(q0 − C))
11q0
, ϑ B1 = ϑ B0
2(q1 + y1)
5q1
, ϑ B2 = ϑ B0
5(q2 + y2)
7q2
. (7)
Observe that, δA and δB enters into ϑ i0 and thereby also into ϑ
i
1 and ϑ
i
2.
For the quasilinear type Q, there is no income effect and
ϑ
Q
0 =
6
q0
, ϑ
Q
1 = ϑ Q0
2(q1 + y1)
3q1
, ϑ
Q
2 = ϑ Q0
2(q2 + y2)
3q2
. (8)
The original shares δA and δB of the two non-quasilinear consumers impact all
market-clearing prices. The prices are
q0 = 30 (77 δ
A C + 62 δB C − 7580)
2310 δA + 1860 δB − 341
q1 = 105 (77 C − 12340) δ
A + 24 (124 C + 54725) δB − 604630
105 (11 C + 12340) δA + 24 (186 C − 54725) δB − 304970 y1
q2 = 21 (847 C − 75500) δ
A + 30 (403 C + 7060) δB − 1516930
42 (77 C + 37750) δA + 12 (403 C − 17650) δB − 552410 y2.
For τ = A, B, the consumption change xτ0 = δτ (q0 − C) appears in the normal-
ization factors of τ ’s utility function. These factors are equal to the equilibrium values
α and β of
(30 + δA(q0 − C))/31 and (30 + δB(q0 − C))/22,
respectively. These normalization factors are not constant and must be determined
together with the optimal allocation. This completes the description of the Cournot–
Walras model of the corporation apart from its objective.
Consider the welfare function of the corporation given by
Wy∗(y+) = 10 α U A(x A(y+)) + 10 β U B(x B(y+)) + 50 U Q(x Q(y+)). (9)
The main difference between (5) and (9) is that the welfare function Wy∗ in (9)
depends on the S-dimensional output vector y+, whereas the welfare function Wˆy∗ in
(5) depends on the (S − 1)-dimensional vector yˆ due to the constraint q0 = C .
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When does q0 equal C in the example? Because
q0 − C = 341 C − 2274002310 δA + 1860 δB − 341
the price q0 equals C if and only if C = 227400/341. Thus, the constraint q0 = C
is satisfied if and only if C is equal to the cost in the partnership equilibrium of the
previous subsection. This is the case if all original shares are owned by the quasilinear
type Q.
3.3 A Pareto-dominating corporation equilibrium
When a corporation equilibrium Pareto dominates the partnership equilibrium slightly,
the utility profiles must be nearly proportional. To obtain a Pareto domination, choose
δA = 0.03035 and δB = 0.02445 so that δQ = 0.00904. Then the equilibrium out-
put of the corporation becomes y+ ≈ (100.6208, 96.6684, 92.7, 102.3789, 125.6972,
149.0154) and exceeds the equilibrium output of the partnership. The size of the out-
put expansion is y+ ≈ (0.034, 0.033, 0.031, 0.033, 0.037, 0.042). The equilibrium
prices are (q0, q1, q2) ≈ (666.7542, 199.4863, 265.4182) and the allocation is
x A ≈ (9.6743, 1.14303, 1.69732, 3.71813, 4.10634, 4.421, 5.24114)
x B ≈ (13.6328, 4.41803, 2.53826, 1.36869, 1.51159, 3.00518, 3.56268)
x Q ≈ (23.9971, 0.900203, 1.08609, 0.836637, 0.923992, 1.02871, 1.21954).
The utility profile (u A, u B , uQ) ≈ (50.8474, 39.1841, 23.9439) exceeds that of
the partnership equilibrium by about (3 · 10−6, 6 · 10−7, 3 · 10−7). Furthermore, C ≈
667.073 exceeds q0 ≈ 666.754.
Clearly, a strong planner, who can choose the production plan and the individual
shares, can do at least as well as the Pareto-dominating corporation. However, no such
planner is needed for the corporation equilibrium.
To understand how the corporation steers the market with the aid of initial shares
to obtain the Pareto improvement, consider the underlying redistribution across types.
First, observe that consumers of type A and B are net buyers and Q is a net seller at
t = 0 because (ϑ A0 − δA, ϑ B0 − δB, ϑ Q0 − δQ) ≈ (0.00012, 0.000086,− 0.000041)
in equilibrium. A’s and B’s utility functions place more weight on future goods than
Q’s, cf. (3). This phenomenon is more pronounced for A than for B.
Type Q needs types A and B to increase the output because A and B exhibit, in
contrast to Q, income effects at t = 0 that raise their demand for shares when they
become richer. The transfer of wealth from Q to A and B increases the demand for
future goods and thereby the output to an extent that turns out to be close to the increase
caused by the strong planner.
The output expansion is accompanied by a cost increase. The transition from the
partnership to the corporation makes all consumers worse off at t = 0 because costs
increase. All become better off at t > 0 due to the output expansion. We know from
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a numerical calculation that the total result is a Pareto improvement. What makes the
net effect beneficial?
Here, the definition of the objective of a corporation comes into play. At the partner-
ship equilibrium, the pricing rule q0 = C is binding and there is underproduction. In
principle, a corporation can achieve a first-order welfare gain by selling above or below
production costs. In the present example, infinitesimal welfare gains are achieved by
an output expansion until DWy∗ = 0, that is to say, until the firm has reached its
objective.
Roughly speaking, the situation in the example is as follows. When Q holds all
initial shares, there is no difference between the corporation and the partnership. When
a small amount of initial shares is assigned to types A and B, then A and B become
better off and Q becomes worse off than at the partnership. The output is expanded and
A and B are subsidized by Q. Near the Pareto-improving corporation, the situation
becomes volatile. If one raises the value of δA = 0.03025 and δB = 0.02445 slightly
to 0.03026 and 0.02446, respectively, then A and B are both worse off than in the
partnership. High values of δA and δB become good for Q and bad for A and B.
4 Conclusions
The paper investigates the role of initial shares in multi-period production economies
with incomplete markets and a single corporation. A suitable allocation of initial
shares can help to correct inefficient consumption decisions due to a wedge between
the output price q0 and the production cost C .
Depending on the example under consideration, the initial output price q0 can be
higher or lower than the production cost C . Prices q0 < C can be needed to expand
the output to a socially desirable level.
In contrast to corporations, partnerships are too rigid to react appropriately to future
needs. At t = 0, the corporation foresees the danger of an underproduction and sells its
output below cost. The partnership cannot do so because q0 must equal C . The output
expansion is limited by the degree of substitution incorporated in the preferences but
it suffices in the example to generate a Pareto improvement.
The window of opportunity to obtain a Pareto-efficient allocation is typically small
because it is difficult to distribute the individual changes so as to keep every agent
above the utility level reached in the partnership.
Forward-looking behavior of economic agents can improve welfare if it is not
prevented by a pricing rule. By definition, a corporation is guided by the gradients of a
family of welfare functions. The individual decisions take all market interactions into
account and, in the example, the corporation induces a socially beneficial redistribution
of wealth due to income effects.
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